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Why the Religious Right Can’t Have Its 
(Straight Wedding) Cake and Eat It Too: 
Breaking the Preservation-Through-
Transformation Dynamic in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission 
Kyle C. Velte† 
Introduction 
In the 2017 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the 
most significant LGBT-rights case since its 2015 marriage equality 
decision:1  Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission.2  The case presents a question—what I call the 
Antidiscrimination Question3—that has been percolating through 
lower courts for nearly a decade:  may small business owners, such 
as photographers, bakers, and florists, be exempt from state 
antidiscrimination laws based on their religious beliefs about same-
sex marriage?4  The Religious Right5 has been squarely behind this 
 
 † Visiting Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law.  I offer 
my thanks to Catherine Christopher, Lauren Fontana, and Jana Hunter for their 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts and to Texas Tech University School of 
Law for its support of this project. 
 1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
 3. See Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the 
Religious Right’s Challenge to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016) 
for an overview of the Anti-Discrimination question and the history of religious 
organizations’ litigation using this concept. 
 4. The specific question presented in Masterpiece is whether Colorado’s public 
accommodation law violates the First Amendment as applied to a baker who refused 
to bake a wedding cake for a gay couple based on the baker’s religious belief that 
marriage is only between one man and one woman. See QUESTION PRESENTED: 
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP (2017), U.S. SUPREME COURT, https://www.supreme
court.gov/qp/16-00111qp.pdf (last accessed Nov. 8, 2017).  Other Antidiscrimination 
Question cases present the same question vis-à-vis a state’s Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).  See, e.g., Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–
59 (N.M. 2013). 
 5. The Religious Right is a leading voice of the anti-LGBT rights movement in 
the United States.  It is an alliance of evangelical Protestant Christians and 
American Roman Catholics, whose goal is to stop and reverse these civil rights 
victories.  I use this phrase as an umbrella term to describe organizations such as 
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effort to carve out religious exemptions for secular businesses from 
generally applicable antidiscrimination laws.6 
The Antidiscrimination Question is as significant as the 
marriage equality question.  It may have more significance due to 
the sweeping scope of what the Religious Right seeks:  the creation 
of quasi-theocratic zones of exemption, disguised in the seemingly 
neutral concept of “religious liberty,” in which Christian business 
owners may pick which laws to follow.7  A decision that the First 
Amendment trumps antidiscrimination laws when applied to 
secular businesses discriminating against LGBT couples would 
have a wide-reaching and devastating impact on the LGBT 
community, ushering in an era of the Gay Jim Crow. 
I have previously addressed the legal and policy axes of the 
Antidiscrimination Question.8  Here, I address the theoretical axis, 
namely the rhetorical tactics being used by the Religious Right in 
its attempt to achieve what Professor Reva Siegel calls 
“preservation-through-transformation”—a dynamic through which 
a group that opposes civil rights reform modernizes its rhetoric after 
a civil rights victory in an attempt to maintain unequal status 
regimes.9  The Religious Right is employing two rhetorical tactics in 
its attempt to maintain a status regime in which LGBT people are 
second-class citizens—one descriptive and one legal.10  Notably, 
these maneuvers are not the primary arguments made by the 
Religious Right.  Rather, the dynamic is working at a more nuanced 
 
Focus on the Family, the Alliance Defending Freedom, the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, the Liberty Counsel, the Freedom of Conscience Defense Fund, American 
Center for Law and Justice, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, the 
Family Research Council, Concerned Women for America, the Faith & Freedom 
Coalition, the Council for National Policy, and the Liberty Institute.  See generally 
FREDERICK CLARKSON, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCS., WHEN EXEMPTION IS THE 
RULE: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM STRATEGY OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 10–12 (Jan. 
2016), http://www.politicalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/When-
Exemption-is-the-Rule-PRA-Report.pdf. 
 6. See id. (discussing the general strategy of the Religious Right in framing its 
policy goals in an attempt to permit exemption from antidiscrimination laws on 
facially permissible bases). 
 7. See Kyle C. Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires with the First Amendment: 
Religious Freedom, the Anti-LGBT Right, and Interest Convergence Theory, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2017). 
 8. See id.; see also Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3 (discussing the role of the 
feminist movement in reforming marriage laws and the continuation of status 
difference in the legal system). 
 9. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178 (1996); see also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, 
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 
YALE L.J. 2516, 2552 (2015). 
 10. See Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
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level, subordinate to the primary legal argument that the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses render 
application of antidiscrimination law unconstitutional.11  Because 
these maneuvers are embedded within and subordinate to the 
primary arguments, it is important to expose them so that LGBT-
rights advocates can expressly argue against them and the Court 
can have the opportunity to expressly address them and break the 
preservation-through-transformation dynamic. 
The descriptive tactic is a revamped narrative about the place 
and perception of the Religious Right in American law and culture.  
Where the Religious Right once used an attacking narrative that 
vilified and pathologized LGBT people to achieve its goal of 
perpetuating status hierarchies, today it has modernized the 
narrative.  It invokes a victimhood narrative rather than an 
attacking one.12  It contends that enforcing antidiscrimination laws 
to require Christian business owners to provide goods and services 
for a same-sex wedding is discrimination against the Religious 
Right.13 
The Religious Right uses this descriptive tactic as a 
springboard to make its secondary and subordinate legal argument, 
the “status-conduct argument.”  This argument insists that what 
LGBT people label as prohibited “discrimination”—denying same-
sex wedding-related goods and services—is not discrimination 
based on sexual orientation (status).14  Rather, the refusal is a 
rejection of conduct—the act of marrying.15  Thus, the argument 
concludes, there is no status-based (sexual orientation) 
discrimination, which is the only type of discrimination which 
antidiscrimination laws prohibit.16  As a result, these businesses 
should be free to refuse same-sex wedding goods and services. 
At first blush, this descriptive and legal rhetoric might appear 
to be new and sui generis in the wake of Obergefell.  However, closer 
examination of the status-conduct argument reveals it is merely an 
 
 11. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Comm’n at 14–16, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762, at 
*14–16. 
 12. See Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
 13. I have previously addressed this narrative shift in greater detail.  See id.; 
Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires, supra note 7, at 1129–1139. 
 14. As used throughout this article, “status” is intended to signify the concept of 
sexual orientation as an identity—heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual. 
 15. See generally, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2516 
(describing the burgeoning requests for religious exemptions as “complicity-based 
conscience claims” and noting that such claims “focus on the conduct of others outside 
the faith community”). 
 16. See infra Part I(d). 
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old trope in new clothing.  The status-conduct argument was 
successfully used for many decades to justify status hierarchies in 
which LGBT people were subordinated.  It was the primary basis of 
court decisions in the 1970s through the mid-2000s when LGBT-
rights activists challenged sodomy laws.17  Often, courts relied on 
the status-conduct distinction to uphold such laws, reasoning that 
states could prohibit conduct;18 these decisions failed to consider the 
inextricable connection between (outlawed) same-sex intimate 
conduct and the status (identity) of being lesbian or gay. 
By looking behind the surface-level First Amendment 
arguments and deconstructing the Religious Right’s subordinate 
arguments, this essay demonstrates what is at stake in Masterpiece, 
namely an attempt to secure the preservation of status regimes in 
the face of civil rights victories through the transformation and 
modernization of the rhetoric utilized by the Religious Right.19  The 
Court should carefully consider the Religious Right’s subordinate 
arguments and soundly reject them—based on its own precedent, 
which has addressed and rejected the status-conduct argument, 
based on accepted notions about what constitutes identity, and 
because it is an important opportunity to expose and break the 
preservation-through-transformation dynamic that works to deny 
LGBT Americans formal equality.  The Religious Right should not 
get a second bite at the status-conduct apple simply by dressing it 
up as an orange.  To allow the resuscitation of an old, factually 
incorrect, and legally untenable position would undermine the 






 17. See Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires, supra note 7, at 1131–1132, for a 
discussion of Religious Right opposition to the repeal of sodomy laws by citing 
conduct such as bestiality and the seduction of children as comparable actions. 
 18. See id. at 1138 n.166 (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent holdings on the 
status-conduct distinction). 
 19. See Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2119; NeJaime & Siegel, 
Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2553 (noting that “religious actors can shift from 
speaking as a majority seeking to enforce traditional morality to speaking as a 
minority seeking exemptions from laws that offend traditional morality” and 
observing that when opponents of marriage equality “can no longer persuade by 
appeal to shared beliefs about the wrongs of same-sex relationships, they may 
instead appeal to beliefs about the importance of protecting religious pluralism, 
revising the secular rationale for the claim in a way that gives more direct and 
uninhibited expression to its religious logic.”). 
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I. What’s Old Is New Again: The Status-Conduct Argument 
in LGBT Civil Rights Litigation 
The Religious Right has employed various arguments and 
narratives throughout its long anti-equality history.20  Tracing its 
trajectory reveals the rhetoric and argument moving from (1) an 
anti-equality agenda based on outright moral disapproval of 
homosexuality, to (2) one that was based on an alleged distinction 
between the status of being LGBT and the conduct associated with 
it, but still cloaked in moral disapproval, to (3) one that no longer 
emphasized the status-conduct distinction but instead made an 
argument about protecting children, to (4) the present-day 
resurrection of a modernized status-conduct argument, this time 
with less emphasis on moral disapproval and more focus on 
characterizing Christian business owners as tolerant of LGBT 
people and seeking merely to decline participating in conduct—the 
act of same-sex marriage. 
Each era builds upon the one before it.  As LGBT equality 
made gains, the next era’s argument opposing that equality took a 
different form designed to absorb the gains and freeze them where 
they were.  This is Siegel’s preservation-through-transformation 
dynamic in action.21  This dynamic is particularly notable in the 
Antidiscrimination Question cases, where we can trace a direct line 
from the status-conduct arguments of forty years ago to the 
modernized version of that argument in Masterpiece.22 
a. The Early Years (1950s Through 1970s): Expressly 
Homophobic Rhetoric, Expressly Homophobic Laws 
As I have described in detail elsewhere,23 the 1950s through 
the 1970s saw a virulently homophobic narrative emanating from 
the Religious Right.24  It was an attacking narrative, grounded in 
Christianity, that characterized “homosexuals”25 as prone to 
 
 20. The history of LGBT rights in American law and the history of LGBT 
organizing in American society is long and rich, stretching back to the 1900s.  
Professor Patricia Cain has provided a comprehensive summary of this history up to 
1993.  See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 
79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993).  The intentionally narrow focus of this essay on just one 
small piece of that history is not meant to diminish the victories won along the way 
or minimize the sting of the other defeats suffered by the LGBT community. 
 21. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9; NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, 
supra note 9, at 2552. 
 22. See Velte, All Fall Down, supra note 3. 
 23. See Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires, supra note 7, at 1129–1132. 
 24. Id. 
 25. “Homosexual” is a label “aggressively used by anti-gay extremists to suggest 
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pedophilia, sick, and child molesters.26  Public policy, laws, and 
regulations tracked this derogatory rhetoric.  For example, in the 
1950s, the federal government fired five thousand government 
employees that it suspected or knew were LGBT.27  In response to 
this “Lavender Scare,” Congress issued a report with language 
mirroring the Religious Right’s rhetoric:  it asserted that LGBT 
people “engage in overt acts of perversion” and “lack the emotional 
stability of normal persons.”28  The executive branch followed suit:  
in 1953, President Eisenhower issued an executive order banning 
LGBT people from federal employment, as well as from employment 
with federal government contractors because LGBT people—along 
with alcoholics and neurotics—presented a security risk.29  The 
American Psychiatric Association fell in line with the Religious 
Right, Congress, and the President when in 1952 it included 
homosexuality as a “sociopathic personality disturbance” in the 
first-ever version of its diagnostic handbook, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM).30 
Notwithstanding these hateful and discriminatory actions by 
the public and private sectors alike, or perhaps because of them, the 
modern-day LGBT-rights movement emerged as the 1950s became 
the 1960s.  The riots at the Stonewall Inn sparked the modern 
LGBT rights movement.31  In response, the Religious Right 
 
that gay people are somehow diseased or psychologically/emotionally disordered.”  
GLAAD Media Reference Guide–Terms to Avoid, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/
reference/offensive (last accessed Nov. 21, 2017).  Most LGBT people and their allies 
prefer the term “same-sex” or “LGBT.” See id. 
 26. DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN 
RIGHT 47–48, 76–78 (1997). 
 27. See Susan Donaldson James, Lavender Scare: U.S. Fired 5,000 Gays in 1953 
‘Witch Hunt’, ABC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/lavender-
scare-us-fired-thousands-gays-infamous-chapter/story?id=15848947. 
 28. See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATION, S. COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXEC. 
DEP’TS, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, 
INTERIM REPORT, 81st Cong., S. Doc. No. 241, at 2, 4 (1950), reprinted in Employment 
of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government (1950), FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/context/employment.html 
(last accessed Nov. 21, 2017). 
 29. See A History of Gay Rights in America, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/
pictures/a-history-of-gay-rights-in-america/6/ (last accessed Nov. 21, 2017). 
 30. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL 
DISORDERS 38–39 (1952), http://www.turkpsikiyatri.org/arsiv/dsm-1952.pdf.  The 
APA did not remove this language until 1973.  See Panelists Recount Events Leading 
to Deleting Homosexuality as a Psychiatric Disorder from DSM, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, 
http://www.psychiatricnews.org/pnews/98-07-17/dsm.html (last accessed Nov. 22, 
2017). 
 31. See This Day in History: 1969 The Stonewall Riot, HISTORY.COM, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-hiatory/the-stonewall-riot (last accessed Nov. 7, 
2017); see also Jasmine Foo, “In Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part”: 
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redoubled its efforts to demonize LGBT Americans.  For example, 
the 1960s saw the Religious Right repeatedly link the LGBT rights 
movement with a propensity to commit sexual crimes;32 it suggested 
that the movement planned to place LGBT teachers in schools to 
sexually molest or force their “lifestyle” on schoolchildren.33 
As the 1960s faded into the 1970s, the Religious Right became 
a potent political force.34  Anita Bryant, a national celebrity, 
launched a campaign to repeal an antidiscrimination ordinance in 
Dade County, Florida, that prohibited sexual orientation 
discrimination.35  A cornerstone of her “Save Our Children” 
campaign was an expressly homophobic claim that homosexuals 
intended to recruit children into a gay life and then molest them.36  
The campaign succeeded and reached beyond Dade County:  two 
days after the vote repealing the county ordinance, Florida’s 
governor signed a law banning adoption by LGBT people.37 
Notably, the Religious Right’s rhetoric in this era did not focus 
on the status-conduct argument.  Rather, anti-LGBT laws, 
regulations, and court decisions were grounded in an 
understanding of homosexuality as immoral, deviant, and 
unhealthy.38  These anti-LGBT laws were buttressed by the fact 
that sodomy was a crime in all fifty states through the 1950s.39 
 
An Examination of FMLA Rights for Same-Sex Spouses and a Case Note on 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 638, 642 (2016). 
 32. See Southern Poverty Law Center, History of the Anti-Gay Movement Since 
1977, INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2005, at 117, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/intelligence-report/2005/history-anti-gay-movement-1977 (noting that “gay 
people commit more serial murders, molest more children, and intentionally spread 
diseases.”). 
 33. HERMAN, supra note 26, at 48, 50.  See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra 
note 32 (noting California State Sen. John Briggs stated:  “One third of San Francisco 
teachers are homosexual,” and “I assume most of them are seducing young boys in 
toilets.”). 
 34. See HERMAN, supra note 26, at 50. 
 35. See Anita Bryant and the Save Our Children Campaign, GAY HISTORY (Aug. 
13, 2009, 9:44 AM), http://gayhistory4u.blogspot.com/2009/08/religious-right-has-
been-on-attack.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Rebecca M. Solokar, Gay and Lesbian Parenting in Florida: Family Creation 
Around the Law, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 473, 477–78 (2009).  See generally FLA. STAT.  
§ 63.042(3) (2006) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that 
person is a homosexual.”), invalidated by Florida Dep’t of Children & Families v. 
X.X.G. (In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G.), 45 So. 3d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
 38. See Williams Institute, Chapter 5: The Legacy of State Laws, Policies, and 
Practices, 1945–Present, at 5-12–13, http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/5_History.pdf (last accessed Nov. 15, 2017). 
 39. See Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy that Led to the 
Lawrence Decision, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-
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The criminalization of homosexuality through sodomy laws 
worked in tandem with the Religious Right’s homophobic rhetoric 
to stymie efforts to secure LGBT civil rights in areas such as 
employment and public accommodations.40  The criminalization of 
sodomy bolstered the narrative that LGBT people were 
pathological, deviant, and criminals. 
b. The Middle Years (1980 Through 1992): Sodomy Is 
Conduct Separate from Status 
By the 1980s, several states had repealed their sodomy laws.41  
In 1986, the Court handed the LGBT community a devastating loss 
when it upheld Georgia’s sodomy law as a constitutional exercise of 
legislative power in Bowers v. Hardwick.42 
The merits and amici briefs in Bowers highlight the emergence 
of the status-conduct argument.43  That argument, coupled with 
morality arguments, was the primary argument in the Religious 
Right’s anti-equality campaign.44  The State and its amici insisted 
that the conduct—“homosexual sodomy”—was the only issue,45 and 
turned to morality as defined by Judeo-Christian values to resolve 
that issue, resulting in an erasure of LGBT identity (status).  The 
merits brief argued that the court of appeals, which struck down the 
statute, took an “activity which for hundreds of years, if not 
thousands, has been uniformly condemned as immoral, and labeled 
that activity as a fundamental liberty protected by the 
Constitution.”46 
Various amici reiterated the status-conduct argument.  One 
framed the issue as whether “the practice of sodomy play[s] the 
same or a similar role to that served by monogamous marriage and 
family life.”47  Another concluded that the right sought by Michael 
 
history-and-strategy-led-lawrence-decision (last accessed Nov. 30, 2017). 
 40. See Williams Institute, supra note 38, at 5-2. 
 41. See Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws, supra note 39. 
 42. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 43. While there is pre-Bowers precedent that utilizes the status-conduct 
distinction, I focus on Bowers because it was the first U.S. Supreme Court case on 
this issue and thus had national impact that was felt for many years.  See, e.g., Cain 
supra note 20, at 1568–1572 (reviewing pre-Bowers cases utilizing the status-
conduct divide). 
 44. See Cain, supra note 20, at 1566. 
 45. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-
140), 1985 WL 667939. 
 46. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 47. Brief for the Rutherford Inst. and the Rutherford Insts. of Alabama et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 12–13, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986) (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 667943 (emphasis added). 
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Hardwick—which it described solely in terms of conduct—was 
“flatly contrary to centuries of Anglo-American tradition”48 and “an 
activity which has been traditionally condemned rather than 
considered a foundation of our society.”49 
Bowers adopted a rhetorical tone consistent with the briefs.  It 
separated conduct from status in framing the issue:  “whether the 
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of 
the many States that still make such conduct illegal.”50  It imbued 
its conduct-based analysis with morality, religion, and tradition, 
holding that no characterization of the right to privacy “would 
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of 
consensual sodomy.”51 
Bowers had devastating consequences for LGBT people for the 
seventeen years that it remained binding precedent.  Despite being 
a criminal law case, it was used in numerous civil cases to deny 
LGBT people protection from discrimination in housing,52 
employment,53 the military,54 and parenting.55  The argument went 
like this:  if the state could legally criminalize the conduct of LGBT 
people, it was permissible to deny them status-based protections 
from discrimination in adoption, parenting, employment, and public 
accommodations.56  If the state may criminalize the conduct, it had 
 
 48. Brief for the Catholic League of Religious and Civil Rights as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting the Petitioner at 2, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-
140), 1985 WL 667940 (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 192. 
 52. See Cain, supra note 20, at 1588 (“So long as gay men and lesbians were 
presumed to engage in acts of criminal sodomy . . . landlords could argue that they 
should not be forced to rent to criminals.”) (citing Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 
1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (noting how homosexuals “suffer discrimination in housing, 
employment and other areas”)). 
 53. See Williams Institute, supra note 38, at 5-36 (noting LGBT people were often 
denied professional licenses based on the presumption that they would engage in 
criminal conduct). 
 54. In 1993, the Pentagon’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy took effect, under which 
members of the military would not be asked about their sexual orientation and would 
not be discharged simply because they were gay; however, engaging in same-sex 
sexual conduct would be grounds for discharge.  Cain, supra note 20, at 1623 n.385.  
The policy “pushe[d] the [status-conduct] dichotomy further than any court . . . .”  Id. 
at 1623.  It was repealed in 2011.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/
us/23military.html?mcubz=3. 
 55. See Cain, supra note 20, at 1624–1625 (noting a case in which the court 
denied a lesbian mother custody based on a presumption that she would engage in 
criminal conduct). 
 56. See Williams Institute, supra note 38, at 5-2. 
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no obligation to protect the status.  Bowers thus promoted and 
expedited the Religious Right’s anti-equality agenda, built on moral 
disapproval of LGBT people and a status-conduct divide;57 in so 
doing, it created the “bedrock of legal discrimination against gay 
men and lesbians.”58 
Seventeen years after it was decided, the Court overruled 
Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.59  The Court struck down a Texas 
statute that criminalized same-sex sodomy60 and thus closed the 
book on one chapter of the LGBT civil rights movement.  With the 
sodomy fight concluded, the marriage equality fight took center 
stage, as did a new rhetoric. 
c.  The Marriage Equality Years (1993 Through 2015): 
Children Take Center Stage  
The national marriage equality debate began in earnest in 
1995, when Utah passed a law prohibiting same-sex marriage, 
followed by thirty other states and Congress.61  These so-called 
Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMA) defined marriage as between one 
man and one woman and permitted states to refuse to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed in other states.62 
Twelve years passed between the first state (Massachusetts) 
legalizing same-sex marriage and the Court declaring it a 
nationwide right in 2015.63  The Religious Right actively fought 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Cain, supra note 20, at 1587. 
 59. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). 
 60. Id. at 562.  As discussed in more detail below, the Lawrence Court collapsed 
the distinction—drawn in Bowers—between LGBT status and the conduct of same-
sex sodomy. 
 61. See Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of 
Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 862 (1998). 
 62. See Samuel Yaggy, A Tale of Two Cases: Baehr v. Miike, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 10 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL’Y & ETHICS 217, 241 (2011).  The Congressional debates on DOMA paralleled 
the “protect the children” rhetoric that the Religious Right used in litigation.  See 
Butler, supra note 61, at 864.  Members of Congress articulated a “responsible 
procreation” justification for DOMA—because LGBT couples cannot reproduce with 
each other, marriage is unnecessary.  Id. at 867.  Others harnessed a rhetoric about 
the health and welfare of children:  “[C]hildren will suffer because family will lose 
its very essence” and “we know that to deliberately create motherless or fatherless 
families is not in the best interest of children” and “it is far better for a child to be 
raised by a mother and a father than by, say, two male homosexuals.”  Id. at 873–
74. 
 63. See Looking Back at the Legalization of Gay Marriage in Mass., BOSTON 
GLOBE (June 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/26/looking-
back-legalization-gay-marriage-mass/uhCeyrSeJtWty9tSUde1PI/story.html (last 
accessed Jan. 4. 2017). 
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against marriage equality, primarily through litigation.64  It 
adopted a very different rhetoric than the one it used in the early 
years and sodomy era.  The status-conduct argument fell into 
disuse, replaced by a rhetoric centered on children, though still 
grounded in a narrative of morality and tradition.65 
The Religious Right’s role in litigation is through non-profit 
legal organizations like the Alliance Defending Freedom (“ADF”),66 
Liberty Counsel,67 Advocates for Faith & Freedom,68 and the Becket 
Fund for Religious Liberty,69 which provide counsel for anti-LGBT 
agendas.70  If not lead counsel, attorneys trained by these 
organizations typically file an amicus brief in these cases.71  Their 
rhetoric in marriage equality litigation illustrates the movement 
away from the status-conduct argument toward an argument about 
children. 
For example, attorneys with the ADF and Advocates for Faith 
& Freedom appeared as counsel for one of the parties in California’s 
marriage equality case, In re Marriage Cases.72  Instead of focusing 
on the status-conduct divide, their brief emphasized procreation 
 
 64. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage 
Equality, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1235, 1308 (2010); see also Douglas NeJaime, Marriage 
Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1182 (2012). 
 65. Butler, supra note 61, at 864. 
 66. The Southern Poverty Law Center has designated the ADF a “hate group” 
because it has “supported the recriminalization of homosexuality in the U.S. . . . 
defended state-sanctioned sterilization of trans people abroad [and] has linked 
homosexuality to pedophilia . . . . ADF also works to develop ‘religious liberty’ 
legislation and case law that will allow the denial of goods and services to LGBT 
people on the basis of religion.”  See Alliance Defending Freedom, S. POVERTY LAW 
CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/alliance-
defending-freedom (last accessed Oct. 30, 2017); see also Sarah Posner, The Christian 
Legal Army Behind ‘Masterpiece Cakeshop,’ THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-army-behind-masterpiece-
cakeshop/ (noting that the ADF “has mushroomed over the past few years into a 
Christian-right powerhouse” and that, since marriage equality, the ADF “has 
positioned itself at the very center of the efforts to curtail LGBTQ rights under the 
guise of religious freedom.”). 
 67. See About Liberty Counsel, LIBERTY COUNSEL, https://www.lc.org/about (last 
accessed Nov. 15, 2017). 
 68. See Our Mission, ADVOCATES FOR FAITH & FREEDOM, http://www.faith-
freedom.com/about/our-mission/ (last accessed Nov. 21, 2017). 
 69. See Our Mission, BECKET, http://www.becketlaw.org/about-us/mission (last 
accessed Nov. 7, 2017). 
 70. See Who We Are, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.adflegal.org/
about-us (last accessed Nov. 7, 2017). 
 71. See, e.g., Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Dist. Ct. Iowa 2007) (No. 
CV5968), 2007 WL 2809775. 
 72. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
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and child-rearing.  It described the State’s interest in banning 
same-sex marriage as promoting “responsible procreation” to 
ensure that children conceived through heterosexual intercourse 
“are raised by both of their biological parents in one household—the 
optimum setting for child rearing.”73  They went further to allege 
that same-sex parents are detrimental to children.74 
The California Supreme Court rejected these arguments, 
holding that the California Constitution required the State to 
license same-sex marriages.75  Soon after, anti-LGBT activists 
placed a proposition on the California ballot to amend the California 
Constitution to ban same-sex marriage.76  Proposition 8 passed by 
a narrow margin in 2008 and was challenged in court.77  Attorneys 
from the ADF represented one of the parties in that case, 
Hollingsworth.78  They again argued about the health and moral 
safety of children, contending that Proposition 8 reflected that “the 
best situation for a child is to be raised by a married mother and 
father.”79 
In United States v. Windsor, in which the Court struck down 
one provision of DOMA, Liberty Counsel filed an amicus brief in 
which it argued that the federal government had an interest in 
“fostering the optimal environment for procreation and the rearing 
of children.”80  The brief further asserted that same-sex parents 
harm children, contending that if the Court struck down the 
challenged DOMA provision, it would “be making a powerful 
statement that our government no longer believes children deserve 
mothers and fathers.  In effect, it would be saying:  ‘Two fathers or 
two mothers are not only just as good as a mother and a father, they 
are just the same.’”81 
 
 73. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 31, Proposition 22 Legal Defense and 
Education Fund v. City of San Francisco, No. 503943, 2004 Cal. Super. LEXIS 1110 
(No. A110651), 2005 WL 3955027 (“Every child raised in a same-sex home has been 
deliberately made to be motherless or fatherless . . . . [T]here is no generally 
applicable, generally accepted social science evidence that children raised by a same-
sex couple do as well as children raised by their own biological parents.”). 
 74. Id. at 31–32. 
 75. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 385. 
 76. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 2658. 
 79. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 
12-144), 2013 WL 1143553 (internal citation omitted). 
 80. Brief for Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent (Merits 
Brief) at 3–4, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 
WL 390994. 
 81. Id. at 37–38. The brief also stated, “[b]y destroying the traditional definition 
of marriage, the family structure will be dramatically transformed.  Many boys will 
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The Manhattan Declaration82 and the Family Research 
Council also filed amicus briefs, echoing the “protect the children” 
narrative exemplified by the Liberty Counsel’s brief.83 
The Religious Right continued its “protect the children” theme 
in Obergefell.  The ADF filed an amicus brief arguing that the Court 
should reject same-sex marriage because married opposite-sex 
parents create the “optimal” environment in which to raise 
children.84 
When the Kentucky marriage equality case—later 
consolidated with Obergefell—was in the Sixth Circuit, the ADF 
filed an amicus brief arguing that “the family structure that helps 
children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a 
low-conflict marriage.”85  It went on to assert that children born via 
anonymous sperm donors—the method most commonly used by 
lesbian couples to conceive a child—“experience profound struggles 
with their origins and identities.”86  Finally, the brief asserted that 
children would be harmed by being raised by same-sex couples 
because “gender-differentiated parenting is important for human 
development.”87  It concluded that redefining marriage as a 
“genderless” institution would “pose a significant risk of negatively 
affecting children and society.”88 
 
grow up without any positive male influence in their lives to show them what it 
means to be a man, and many girls will grow up without any female influence to 
show them what it means to be a lady.”  Id. at 38. 
 82. The Manhattan Declaration is a non-profit organization that seeks to “uphold 
Christian values respecting life, marriage and family, and religious liberty.”  Brief 
for Manhattan Declaration as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent (Merits Brief) 
at 1, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 390995. 
 83. See id. at 9, 15 (arguing marriage equality would have “predictably 
deleterious consequences for children and society at large”); Brief for Family 
Research Council as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent (Merits Brief) at 21, 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 315235 
(“[M]arriage exists for the primary purpose of ‘ensuring a stable legal and societal 
framework in which children are procreated and raised, and providing the benefits 
of dual gender parenting for the children so procreated.’”). 
 84. See Brief for State of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
6, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 12-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-
574), 2015 WL 1534344. 
 85. Brief of Individual Tennessee Legislators as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants-Appellants at 16, Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (No. 14-5297), 
2014 WL 2154833. 
 86. Id. at 17 (internal citations omitted). 
 87. Id. at 19. 
 88. Id. at 25–26.  Identical arguments were made by ADF attorneys in its amicus 
brief in the Tennessee marriage equality case that was consolidated with Obergefell, 
as well as in the Sixth Circuit in Obergefell itself.  See Brief for Individual Tennessee 
Legislators as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Tanco v. Haslam 
135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015), (No. 14-5297), 2014 WL 2154833; Brief for Citizens for 
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The Foundation for Moral Law, an organization “dedicated to 
defending the unalienable right to acknowledge God as the moral 
foundation of our laws,”89 filed an amicus brief in which it asserted 
that “statistics . . . show that homosexual parents, as compared to 
straight parents, were five times more likely to have harmed their 
children through neglect, seduction, emotional distress, or 
instability.”90  It contended children raised by LGBT parents were 
“about 35% less likely to graduate from High School on time . . . ‘had 
poorer emotional health . . . had more learning problems . . . [and 
received more] therapy or special education’” than children of 
heterosexual parents.91 
d. Post-Marriage Equality: Marriage Is Separate from LGBT 
Status 
i. The Shifting Rhetoric 
In the two years since Obergefell, the Religious Right has 
moved the battle to a quest for exemptions from nondiscrimination 
laws that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  To set up its 
legal argument, it shifted both its rhetoric—positioning itself as a 
victim of secularism rather than its prior posturing as a savior of 
children and American morals and values92—and its legal 
arguments—modernizing and retooling the status-conduct 
argument.  These two moves work in tandem:  the Religious Right 
contends that its members are the victims of secularism—
positioned as bigots and social pariahs93—and then leverages that 
narrative to assert that they actually are not bigots or pariahs 
because they are not discriminating based on customers’ sexual 
orientation.  Instead, they are simply (and permissibly) making a 
choice not to approve conduct—the act of same-sex marriage.94 
 
Community Values as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants at 4, 
Obergefell v. Himes, No. 14-3057 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 1653834. 
 89. Brief for Foundation for Moral Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 1, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 15-562, 
14-571 & 14-574), 2015 WL 1519044. 
 90. Id. at 25. 
 91. Id. at 26 (alternation in original). 
 92. See NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2561 (describing, in 
the face of marriage equality, the narrative shift by the Religious Right “from 
speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as a minority 
seeking exemptions based on religious identity”). 
 93. See generally id. at 2560 (noting that the Religious Right’s older morality-
based arguments against marriage equality “now sound[] illegitimate—like 
‘bigotry’”). 
 94. For example, the ADF argued that the application of Minnesota’s 
antidiscrimination law to a Christian couple who own a videography business—and 
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ii.  New Rhetoric, Old Trope: The Religious Right’s 
Modernization of the Status-Conduct Argument in 
Antidiscrimination Question Cases 
The new narrative has played out across the country as parties 
have litigated the Antidiscrimination Question.  The pleadings 
reveal a modernized status-conduct argument, one being used to 
justify religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws and thus 
preserves an anti-LGBT status regime.  Masterpiece gives the Court 
its first opportunity to weigh in on the Antidiscrimination Question, 
and the briefs in it illustrate the subordinate use of the status-
conduct argument to bolster the primary, First Amendment, 
arguments. 
In its merits brief, the ADF asserts that its client, Jack 
Phillips, refused to make a wedding cake for a gay wedding 
“‘because of’ [his] opposition to same-sex marriage, not because of 
[his] opposition to their sexual orientation.”95  It argues that 
“Phillips did not categorically refuse to serve Craig and Mullins; he 
only declined to create a custom wedding cake that would celebrate 
their marriage.”96 
Amici in Masterpiece follow suit.  Amicus Liberty Counsel 
argues that “Mr. Phillips declined to prepare a wedding cake . . . not 
because of [Craig and Mullins’] sexual orientation, but because of 
his religious beliefs that provide that marriage is only the union of 
one man and one woman.”97  Amicus Christian Business Owners 
Supporting Religious Freedom asserted:  “Petitioners do not, and 
have never, wished to discriminate against Respondents based on 
their sexual orientation.”98  Amicus Indiana Family Institute 
contends that “[w]hat is at issue in same-sex marriage is conduct, 
 
who do not want to provide services for same-sex weddings—would “deny [their] self-
identity, dignity, liberty, intimate personal choices, and personhood” and would 
“strip[] them of their of [sic.] dignity, stigmatize[] their very identity as social 
pariah[s], and punish[] them.”  Complaint at 15, Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey 
No. 0:16-CV-04094 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2016), 2016 WL 7157607; see also NeJaime & 
Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2560 (noting that in the marriage equality 
context, the Religious Right “draw[s] on concepts of complicity to seek exemptions 
for those who object to facilitating or sanctioning another’s sinful conduct”) 
(emphasis added). 
 95. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (S. Ct. filed Aug. 31, 2017), 2017 WL 3913762. 
 96. Id. at 52–53. 
 97. Brief for Liberty Counsel as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 31, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (S. Ct. filed 
Sept. 7, 2017), 2017 WL 4005663. 
 98. Brief for Christian Business Owners as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 21, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111 (S. 
Ct. filed Sept. 7, 2017), 2017 WL 4005666. 
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yet the lower court decided that . . . refusing expressive services for 
a same-sex wedding is discrimination based on sexual orientation 
status,”99 and “though this Court has found a right to engage in 
same-sex marriage, refusal to participate is not discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.”100  In an amicus brief, the Becket Fund 
for Religious Liberty argued that “Phillips’ objection was to 
participating in and facilitating a wedding ceremony, as opposed to 
any concern about sexual orientation.”101 
Masterpiece is just the latest of many cases in which the ADF 
resurrects a modernized status-conduct argument to achieve 
preservation-through-transformation.102 
As further explained below, the Religious Right is attempting 
to leverage the preservation-through-transformation dynamic:  
preserving a measure of status hierarchy by transforming its 
rhetoric to one that is presented as devoid of bias and homophobia 
 
 99. Brief for Indiana Family Institute, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 
16-111 (S. Ct. filed Aug. 31, 2017), 2017 WL 3913765 (emphasis in original). 
 100. Id. at 14. 
 101. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 25, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 
16-111 (S. Ct. filed Sept. 7, 2017), 2017 WL 4004526. 
 102. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) 
(stating the views of a Christian photographer were that refusal to photograph a 
same-sex wedding was not sexual orientation discrimination but rather a declination 
to send a message about the act of same-sex marriage); Washington v. Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (stating that a Christian florist refused to 
sell flowers for a same-sex wedding because of religious beliefs about marriage, 
rather than sexual orientation); Complaint at 8, Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of 
Phoenix, CV 2016-052251 (Ariz. Super. Ct. May 12, 2016) (illustrating arguments by 
Christian businesswomen that refusal of services for same-sex weddings is not 
sexual orientation discrimination but rather a declination to support the act of 
marriage); Respondent Hands On Originals’ Verified Statement of Position at 8–9, 
Baker v. Hands on Originals, Inc., Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights 
Comm’n, HRC # 03-12-3135 (Apr. 19, 2012) (stating the views of a Christian business 
owner who argued refusal to print Gay Pride shirts was not “because of the 
prospective customer’s sexual orientation” but rather a rejection of the message that 
LGBT people should be “‘proud’ about engaging in homosexual behavior or same-sex 
relationships”); Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey, No. 16-4094 (JRT/LIB) (D. Minn. 
Dec. 6, 2016), 2017 WL 4179899 (showcasing arguments by Christian videographers 
that denial of services for a same-sex wedding is not discrimination based on sexual 
orientation); Brief for Petitioner, Klein v. Oregon Bureau Of Labor and Industries, 
Nos. 44-14, 45-14 (Or. Ct. App Jul. 17, 2017), 2016 WL 8465675 (detailing a baker’s 
argument that refusal to make a cake for a same-sex wedding was not based on 
sexual orientation but on the baker’s religious beliefs about same-sex weddings); 
Brief for Legal Scholars in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive 
Freedom as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6, Washington v. Arlene’s 
Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-2) (“She is happy to serve gay and 
lesbian customers . . . . She is simply religiously opposed to participating in a same-
sex marriage by providing one particular kind of service namely, designing and 
creating flower arrangements to celebrate a same-sex wedding.”). 
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and instead grounded in protecting Christian business owners 
through the revered principles of the First Amendment. 
II. Siegel’s Preservation-Through-Transformation 
Framework 
The foregoing overview of the Religious Right’s decades-long 
shifting rhetoric demonstrates that Masterpiece is merely the next 
step in an attempt to maintain a status hierarchy.  This Section 
places the historical overview into a theoretical frame, namely 
Siegel’s preservation-through-transformation frame. 
a. Preservation-Through-Transformation and the Dynamism 
of Status Regimes 
Status regimes are dynamic, not static.103  Even after a civil 
rights victory as significant as marriage equality, the status of 
LGBT people and couples can—and will—continue to be contested, 
both normatively and legally.  Interrogating the narrative of this 
contestation reveals that it is merely a modern expression of a 
historical inequity.  Siegel posits that while civil rights efforts do in 
fact create some status changes, the extent of such change is 
limited.104  Backlash to the victory, embodied in a deformalized and 
modernized narrative, works to maintain status hierarchies:  
“When the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully contested, 
lawmakers and jurists will both cede and defend status privileges—
gradually relinquishing the original rules and justificatory rhetoric 
of the contested regime and finding new rules and reasons to protect 
such status privileges as they choose to defend.”105  As a result, civil 
rights victories work to “breathe new life into a body of status law, 
by pressuring legal elites to translate it into a more contemporary, 
and less controversial, social idiom . . . . [T]his kind of change in the 
rules and rhetoric of a status regime [is] ‘preservation through 
transformation’ . . . .”106 
The transformation of anti-equality rhetoric results from 
modernization, which comes about through “diverse political forces” 
and “evolving social mores.”107  More specifically, status regimes are 
modernized when “a legal system enforces social stratification by 
 
 103. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2175. 
 104. Id. at 2119. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2175. 
84 Law & Inequality [Vol. 36: 67 
means that change over time.”108  The modernization is necessary 
as a response to “civil rights agitation”—protest that causes the 
legitimacy of a status regime to be questioned and puts pressure on 
legislators and “other legal elites” to give up status privileges.109  In 
the course of relinquishing some status privileges, these “legal 
elites” will also defend them, but will need to find new reasons to do 
so.110  The dynamic of “ceding and defending status privileges will 
result in changes in the constitutive rules of the regime and in its 
justificatory rhetoric.”111  Thus, “over time, status relationships will 
be translated from an older, socially contested idiom into a newer, 
more socially acceptable idiom.”112  Put simply, a status regime 
“chang[es] shape as it is contested.”113 
Those seeking to reconstitute the now-discredited status 
regime must “reform the contested body of law sufficiently so that 
the regime that emerges from reform can be differentiated from its 
contested predecessor.”114  Moreover, for the emerging status 
regime to restore its legitimacy, it must distribute social goods in 
ways that differentiate it from the previously-contested regime.115  
This is the dynamic of preservation-through-transformation.116 
Siegel suggests that the modernization of status hierarchies is 
the price we must pay for civil rights victories.117  Below, I urge the 
 
 108. Id. at 2178. 
 109. Id. at 2179. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1280. 
 116. The preservation-through-transformation dynamic runs both ways.  Id. at 
2185.  The rhetoric of a civil rights movement may be coopted by anti-equality 
advocates to modernize and thus preserve status regimes.  Id.  In the context of race, 
the Civil Rights Movement argued for colorblindness in the law; today, the rhetoric 
of colorblindness has been coopted to “supply ‘legitimate,’ ‘nondiscriminatory’ 
reasons for opposition to affirmative action.”  Id. at 2185.  The cooptation of civil 
rights rhetoric thus provides justification for anti-equality advocates’ opposition to 
true racial equality.  Id. at 2186–87 (noting anti-equality advocates “justify their 
opposition in terms that can be differentiated from a naked interest in preserving 
race and gender stratification”). 
 117. Id. at 2179 (“[C]ivil rights reform is an important engine of social change.  
Yet civil rights reform does not simply abolish a status regime; in important respects, 
it modernizes the rules and rhetoric through which status relations are enforced and 
justified.”).  It is important to note, however, that the modernization of a status 
regime “may still bring about perceptible, even significant, changes in status 
relations.”  Id. at 2184.  It is beyond dispute that the marriage equality movement, 
culminating in Obergefell, brought about significant change in then-existing status 
regimes.  The legal rights, benefits, and obligations to which LGBT people gained 
access cannot be understated, nor can the dignitary benefits of the decision for LGBT 
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Court to prove Siegel wrong in the instance of the 
Antidiscrimination Question by exposing and rejecting the 
Religious Right’s attempt at preservation-through-transformation. 
b. Masterpiece and the Evolution of Anti-LGBT Status 
Regimes 
Through its modernization of the status-conduct argument, 
the Religious Right attempts to chip away at Obergefell and thus 
maintain a status regime that marginalizes and demeans LGBT 
people.118  As previously noted, the sodomy era saw the first 
iteration of the status-conduct argument—as one framed in a 
rhetoric of pathology, immorality, and criminality119 and wielded 
assertively to justify widespread discrimination against LGBT 
Americans.120  Characterizing LGBT people as criminals, predators, 
and mentally ill was an accepted and normalized rhetorical position 
that resulted in legal regimes that treated them as such.121 
As LGBT Americans came out of the closet, organized, and 
agitated, they displayed a narrative that they were law-abiding, 
tax-paying, mentally healthy, family-oriented people with inherent 
human worth and dignity, thus contesting the Religious Right’s 
sodomy era rhetoric.  This rendered the status-conduct argument, 
cloaked as it was in a deeply negative rhetoric about LGBT people, 
into a “controversial, social idiom”122 that could no longer survive.  
In fact, it was rejected—at least in the sodomy context—in 
Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court held that LGBT people “are 
entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean 
their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.”123 
 
people.  See Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 HOUSTON L. REV.: OFF 
THE RECORD 157 (2015). 
 118. As NeJaime and Siegel note, “social conservatives long used arguments from 
traditional morality to oppose recognizing same-sex relationships.  But these 
arguments about lesbians and gay men now sound illegitimate—like ‘bigotry.’  In 
response, advocates have changed the secular rationale for their position in ways 
that give increasingly uninhibited expression to its religious logic . . . .[T]hey argue 
for exemptions from laws that recognize same-sex marriage.  In so doing, they shift 
from speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as a minority 
seeking exemptions based on religious identity.”  NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience 
Wars, supra note 9, at 2559, 2561. 
 119. See supra Part I(b). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2119. 
 123. 539 U.S. 558, 578. 
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After Lawrence rendered its status-conduct argument 
controversial, and arguably dead, the Religious Right was forced to 
rationalize its continued opposition in a rhetoric that could be 
“differentiated from a naked interest in preserving”124 the anti-
LGBT status regime.  It did so by shifting its narrative to one of 
“protecting children” during the marriage equality years.125  It lost 
that fight in Obergefell. 
Today, the Religious Right must again modernize its 
justifications for preserving a sexual orientation status regime and 
do so in a way that can be “differentiated from a naked interest in 
preserving”126 that stratification.  Although several justifications 
might suffice, “claiming fidelity to principles of equality would seem 
to provide an unimpeachable reason”127 for opposing true formal 
equality for LGBT people.  In other words, if the modernized 
rhetoric is framed within a righteous reason, one grounded in 
uncontested American values and principles, it will come across not 
as trying to dismantle civil rights gains but as a neutral reaction to 
those gains. 
In Masterpiece, the Religious Right makes a valiant attempt to 
present a righteous reason to limit the reach of Obergefell:  it 
modernizes its rhetoric into one grounded in American values and 
legal principles as revered as the principle of equality—religious 
freedom and free expression.  Using these “unimpeachable 
reason[s],” the Religious Right has modernized the status-conduct 
argument; this is the “modern expression[] of [a] putatively 
discredited doctrine.”128  This modernization of the status-conduct 
rhetoric proves Siegel’s point that “[s]tatus talk is mutable, and 
remarkably adaptable:  it will evolve as the rule structure of a 
status regime evolves.”129 
In sum, by resurrecting and modernizing the status-conduct 
argument in the context of “unimpeachable reason[ing],”130 the 
Religious Right is attempting to operationalize the preservation-
through-transformation dynamic.131 
 
 124. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2186. 
 125. See supra Part I(c). 
 126. Siegel, “Rule of Love”, supra note 9, at 2186. 
 127. Id. at 2187. 
 128. Id. at 2175, 2187. 
 129. Id. at 2175. 
 130. Id. at 2187. 
 131. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 9, at 2565 (“With 
growing acceptance of the contested conduct, appeals to religious liberty offer a more 
persuasive secular ground on which to base persisting objections to the conduct.  The 
goal may be not only to restrict the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, but also 
2018] (Straight Wedding) Cake 87 
III. Breaking Through the Preservation-Through-
Transformation Dynamic 
In Masterpiece, the Court should reject the Religious Right’s 
subordinate status-conduct argument for three reasons:  (a) legal 
precedent directs that outcome, (b) well-established concepts of 
identity undermine the notion that it is possible to separate conduct 
from sexual orientation, and (c) the necessity of breaking the 
preservation-through-transformation dynamic to achieve 
meaningful formal equality for LGBT Americans. 
a. The Doctrinal Basis for Rejecting the Status-Conduct 
Distinction132 
There have been seven significant LGBT-rights cases decided 
by the Court since Bowers.133  Five of these—Romer, Lawrence, 
Christian Legal Society (“CLS”), Windsor, and Obergefell—provide 
a strong, if not dispositive, precedent to reject outright the Religious 
Right’s modernized status-conduct argument. 
Romer and Lawrence, considered together, reveal the Court’s 
belief that LGBT status cannot be separated from LGBT conduct 
when analyzing antidiscrimination laws under the Constitution.  In 
Romer, the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution, known as Amendment 2, which repealed all local and 
municipal antidiscrimination laws that prohibited discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and prohibited the future passage of 
any such laws.134  The Court held that Amendment 2 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it was grounded in anti-LGBT 
animus, as evidenced by the fact that it “identifies persons by a 
single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”135  
 
to forestall or restrict an antidiscrimination regime that includes sexual orientation.  
In states with antidiscrimination laws that cover sexual orientation, religious 
objections to same-sex marriage have provided a basis on which to seek the 
expansion of already-existing exemptions in the laws.”). 
 132. For deeper discussions of this issue, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex 
Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and the Law’s Social Meaning, 97 VA. L. REV. 
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 133. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675 (2013); CLS v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Romer v. Evans, 
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Thus, Romer held that laws which classify on the basis of sexual 
orientation as a status may be unconstitutional.  In Lawrence, the 
Court ended the sodomy era when it declared Texas’s sodomy law 
to be unconstitutional—holding that LGBT conduct is entitled to 
constitutional protection because the Due Process Clause gives 
LGBT people “the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government.”136  The Lawrence Court spoke 
openly about the connection between criminalizing LGBT conduct 
and the dignitary and legal harms to LGBT people in all spheres of 
life.137  Taken together, Romer and Lawrence establish that status 
and conduct cannot be disentangled when analyzing laws that 
classify based on sexual orientation.138 
CLS involved Hastings College of Law’s antidiscrimination 
policy.139  The policy was invoked to deny the Christian Legal 
Society (“CLS”) official recognition as a student group, based on 
CLS’s requirement that students seeking membership adopt a 
statement of faith that required any LGBT students seeking 
membership to disavow their “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”140  
The Court upheld the application of the antidiscrimination policy to 
CLS, uniting its holdings in Romer and Lawrence to expressly 
recognize that LGBT status and conduct cannot be separated when 
considering antidiscrimination policies, laws, and the 
Constitution.141  CLS argued that Hastings should allow CLS to 
exclude students based on the potential members’ beliefs but not 
permit such exclusion based on status.142  Specifically, it asserted 
that it did not exclude potential members “because of sexual 
orientation, but rather ‘on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and 
the belief that the conduct is not wrong.’”143  The Court rejected this 
and, citing Lawrence, addressed the status-conduct argument:  “Our 
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct 
in this context.”144 
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In Windsor, the Court acknowledged the link between LGBT 
status and the conduct of marriage.  Specifically, it recognized the 
important social and legal connection between sexual orientation 
and same-sex marriage: 
Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons 
of the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it can 
form “but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring.” . . .  For same-sex couples who wished to be married, 
the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.  
This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the 
intimate relationship between two people, a relationship 
deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal 
with all other marriages.145 
The Court held that DOMA’s exclusion of state same-sex 
marriages from federal recognition imposed a “disadvantage, a 
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex 
marriages made lawful by . . . the States” and had “the purpose and 
effect of disapproval of that class”—implicitly recognizing that 
LGBT status (sexual orientation) is fundamentally connected with 
conduct, such as same-sex marriage, that relates to that status.146  
It more explicitly wed status and conduct when it cited Lawrence 
for the proposition that “DOMA undermines both the public and 
private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages” 
because it “tells those couples, and all the world, that their 
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition” and 
“places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a 
second-tier marriage.”147  Finally, the Court again tied LGBT status 
to the conduct of same-sex marriage when it noted that “[t]he class 
to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those 
persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
State.  DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State 
entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own 
liberty.”148 
Most recently, Obergefell made clear that the Court believes 
LGBT status and conduct are so interconnected that the essence of 
LGBT identity encompasses conduct.149  For example, speaking of 
the sodomy era, the Court noted that for many years, LGBT 
Americans could not embrace the entirety of their identity (status) 
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because sodomy was criminalized.150  It noted that “[t]here is 
dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to 
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choice[,]”151 
suggesting that the conduct of getting married is intimately linked 
to one’s autonomy as an LGBT individual (status).  The Court 
quoted Lawrence for the proposition that “‘[w]hen sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring’” and went on to explain that Lawrence did not go far 
enough:  “[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that 
allows individuals to engage in intimate association without 
criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there.  
Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the 
full promise of liberty.”152  Finally, the Court’s connection of LGBT 
“personhood” to the act of marrying makes explicit the Court’s 
disapproval of the status-conduct argument:  “Under the 
Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal 
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their 
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”153 
The majority of the lower courts that have considered the 
Antidiscrimination Question have agreed that the Court’s LGBT 
jurisprudence directs that sexual orientation as a status and the 
conduct of marriage simply cannot be separated from each other.154  
The Court should confirm these lower court holdings and expressly 
reject the status-conduct argument once and for all. 
b. The Social-Identity Basis for Rejecting the Status-Conduct 
Distinction 
In addition to legal precedent, concepts of identity also compel 
the rejection of the modernized status-conduct argument.  Professor 
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Douglas NeJaime argues that the Antidiscrimination Question goes 
well beyond same-sex marriage, implicating a much larger sexual 
orientation-based identity claim.155  He posits that the fact that 
LGBT people “enact their sexual orientation through same-sex 
relationships”156 spurs the Religious Right to seek exemptions from 
antidiscrimination law, and same-sex marriage simply provides the 
most logical vehicle through which to challenge that enactment of 
identity.157  To achieve a sexual orientation antidiscrimination 
regime that is meaningful and robust, he argues, we must include 
a relationship-based understanding of LGBT identity.158 
NeJaime contends that the essence of sexual orientation is 
relational and grounded in conduct.159  Performing sexual 
orientation by engaging in a relationship is a highly salient 
characteristic of one’s sexual orientation.160  In his theorizing about 
“covering,” Professor Kenji Yoshino posits that sexual orientation is 
performative, arguing that “homosexual self-identification and 
homosexual conduct are sufficiently central to gay identity that 
burdening such acts is tantamount to burdening gay status.”161 
When LGBT people appear single, others can avoid visualizing 
the same-sex sexual conduct that largely defines that status of 
being LGBT.162  Thus, conduct is constitutive of LGBT status; the 
two cannot be separated without stripping LGBT status (identity) 
of its core component.163  While it is true that “an individual’s sexual 
interests are internal,”164 those interests are directed externally 
toward another person, thus rendering sexual orientation 
inherently relational;165 relationships are conduct-based.166  As 
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NeJaime observes, “[e]ntering, performing, and publicly showing a 
same-sex relationship serves as a central way of embracing and 
maintaining one’s lesbian or gay identity.”167 
Conceptualizing LGBT identity (status) in this way 
underscores the importance of collapsing the status-conduct divide 
in antidiscrimination law.  Accepting that LGBT status and conduct 
can be separated would mean dissolving the core of what it means 
to be LGBT, rendering antidiscrimination protections based only on 
“status” useless.  The Court should embrace this conduct-
constitutive conception of LGBT status (identity) as it considers the 
status-conduct arguments being asserted by the Religious Right in 
Masterpiece. 
c. The Court Should Seize the Opportunity to Break the 
Preservation-Through-Transformation Dynamic 
While the Court has solid doctrinal and identity-theory 
grounds on which to reject the status-conduct arguments presented 
in Masterpiece, the most important reason for it to do so is to break 
the preservation-through-transformation dynamic.  Disrupting this 
cycle would be a breakthrough in formal equality for LGBT 
Americans. 
If the Court fails to expose and reject this attempt at 
preservation-through-transformation, it will cooperate in 
naturalizing the Religious Right’s modernized status regime as 
“just and reasonable”168 by giving credence to (and placing the 
imprimatur of the Court upon) the subtextual message, embodied 
in the modernized status-conduct argument, that such argument is 
“formally and substantively distinguishable from its contested 
predecessor.”169  More specifically, the Court would be complicit in 
the Religious Right’s effort to justify its modernized status regime 
by accepting the notion that the justificatory social values embodied 
in the current status-conduct argument are distinct from the 
“orthodox, hierarchy-based norms that characterized its 
predecessor”170 (sodomy and expressly homophobic law) “as a 
regime of mastery.”171  If the Court does not expose and reject the 
Religious Right’s modernized status-conduct argument, it will 
participate in the enhancement of “the legal system’s capacity to 
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legitimate residual social inequalities among status-differentiated 
groups.”172 
The Court simply cannot take part in this effort to re-
legitimize and reestablish an anti-LGBT regime such that it is “once 
again . . . justified as ‘reasonable.’”173  Doing so would allow our 
legal system to continue to enforce a social stratification that it has 
previously rejected,174 but by “a new regime, formally 
distinguishable from its predecessor, that will protect the privileges 
of heretofore dominant groups, although not necessarily to the same 
degree.”175  It will be formally distinguishable because it will be 
grounded in the Free Exercise and Free Speech (rather than express 
animus and outright homophobia), which on their face appear 
neutral and non-discriminatory and which speak to core American 
values.  The Court simply cannot permit the Religious Right to 
harness and co-opt the First Amendment to modernize unequal 
status regimes to permit discrimination against LGBT Americans.  
The harm that will result would be the denial of full equality for 
LGBT people and, thus, the creation of second-class citizenship for 
LGBT Americans. 
To hold otherwise would cast doubt on the strength and 
legitimacy of the Court’s precedent.  If groups that disagree with 
the Court’s decision are permitted to undermine established 
precedent by merely updating previously-rejected arguments, the 
Court appears weak at best.  At worst, the Court might appear 
incompetent, inconsistent, or even hypocritical as it would be an 
active participant in sustaining status hierarchies in the face of 
(and in contradiction to) its own precedent. 
Moreover, the Court’s express rejection of preservation-
through-transformation in Masterpiece will have a positive ripple 
effect in future civil rights cases.  There is a power in naming and 
claiming:  once the Court exposes and rejects this dynamic as an 
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equality-eroding, hierarchy-preserving mechanism, future civil 
rights victories will have the potential for true transformation. 
Conclusion 
History’s lessons will be illustrated in their most salient and 
pronounced form by recognizing recurring patterns—like the 
modernization of the status-conduct argument in Masterpiece.  The 
Court should heed the lessons of history, the lessons of precedent, 
and the reality of human identity and reject the status-conduct 
argument once and for all. 
Siegel notes that the judges who participate in perpetuation of 
the preservation-through-transformation dynamic do not do so 
consciously or with nefarious intent.176  She goes so far as to 
presume that they are acting in good faith.177  As such, operation of 
the preservation-through-transformation dynamic tracks the 
operation of implicit bias—the phenomenon by which “people who 
genuinely believe that they are behaving equitably [] 
unintentionally act in ways that are not.”178  Both phenomena must 
be explained, revealed, contextualized, and denounced so that 
courts can break the cycles of discrimination that such phenomena 
cause.179 
Siegel has done the work of explaining, revealing, and 
denouncing the preservation-through-transformation dynamic in 
both the domestic violence, race discrimination, and pre-Obergefell 
marriage contexts.180  Here, I have attempted to take that 
explanation, and to reveal and renounce its use in Masterpiece and 
other Antidiscrimination Question cases to continue a status 
regime that marginalizes LGBT people.  It is now up to the Court 
to seize on the opportunity to do so. 
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